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STATE OF UTAH 
PETER VOS, JR., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IML FREIGHT, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant, a third-party beneficiary of certain agree-
ments (R. 35) entered into between his Union and re-
spondent, was discharged without just cause in violation 
of said agreements and brought action against respon-
dent to be reinstated as an employee of respondent as 
an over-the-road cab driver, or in the alternative be 
awarded general and punitive damages suffered by him 
as result of his employment being unjustly terminated. 
Case No. 
13752 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The Court granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed appellant's complaint with preju-
dice and upon the merits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's judg-
ment of dismissal only as to the defendant, IML Freight, 
Inc., and entered no objection to the dismissal of IML 
Freight International, Inc., a defendant in the Court 
below. Appellant, also, seeks a decision by the Supreme 
Court directing the lower Court to proceed with the trial 
of the case on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FACTS RELATING TO APPELLANT'S COM-
PLAINT TO BE REINSTATED AS AN EM-
PLOYEE OF RESPONDENT OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, TO BE AWARDED GEN-
ERAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES SUF-
FERED BY APPELLANT AS RESULT OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT BEING UNJUSTLY 
TERMINATED. 
Plaintiff from on or about April 5, 1963, to June 4, 
1974, was employed by defendant, IML Freight, Inc., 
as an over-the-road cab driver domiciled at Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The terms and conditions of his employment 
with defendant were governed by the provisions of two 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
collective bargaining labor agreements known as the 1970-
1973 National Master Freight Agreement and the West-
ern States Area Over-the-Road Supplemental Agreement 
(R. 35) and the same will hereafter be referred to as 
Master Agreement or Supplemental Agreement. These 
agreements were negotiated between the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters and the trucking industry. 
Plaintiff at the time of his employment with defendant 
was a member of and represented by Teamsters Local 
Union 222, which union was subject to and bound by 
said labor agreements. 
A letter signed by a representative of defendant (R. 
35) dated June 4, 1973, (R. 31) terminated plaintiff's 
employment. Article 46, Sec. 1 of the Supplemental 
Agreement (R. 35) provides: 
The employer shall not discharge nor suspend 
any employee without just cause, but in respect 
to discharge or suspension shall give at least 
one (1) warning notice of the complaint against 
such employee to the employee in writing, and 
a copy of the same to the Local Union affected 
Plaintiff protested his discbarge as required by Sec. 
3 (b) of Article 46 aforesaid, through his Local Union 
222 and hearings were held on the protest as provided by 
Article 45, Sec. 1 (a) and (b) of the Supplemental Agree-
ment (R. 35). 
Local Union 222 and defendant being unable to re-
solve the protest, hearings were held as provided in Ar-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
tide 45, Sec. 1 (g), P. 18, which provides that the griev-
ance procedures can only be invoked by the authorized 
union representative or the employer. Hearings were 
held pursuant to these procedures, one at Boise, Idaho 
which deadlocked and subsequently in San Francisco, 
California (Joint Western Area Committee), which ruled 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff up-
holding the dismissal. Plaintiff was represented at all 
the hearings by a union representative furnished to him 
by the Local Union but was personally present only at 
the San Francisco hearing. 
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint (R. 36, 37 and 38) 
a cause of action based on his discharge by the defendant 
without just cause as required by the labor agreements 
and he further alleged that the discharge damaged him 
in loss of wages and other benefits incidental to his em-
ployment. Defendant answered the complaint (R. 32, 33 
and 34) which answer raised an issue of fact as to whether 
plaintiff was unjustly discharged by defendant. After 
answering the complaint, defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment based on the complaint and plaintiff's 
answer to request for admissions (R. 22, 23 and 24). 
Answer 11 (R. 24) of answer to request for admissions, 
plaintiff asserts that the decision of the Joint Western 
Area Committee which was only by a majority vote was 
arbitrary and based on insubstantial evidence and his 
discharge was without just cause and in violation of 
his constitutional right of due process as guaranteed in 
Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States. 
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To the motion for summary judgment (R. 18) and 
the affidavit (R. 19, 20 and 21) filed by defendant in 
support of said motion, plaintiff filed an affidavit (R. 
10,11 and 12) in opposition to defendant's affidavit which 
fully answered defendant's affidavit and plaintiff de-
posed in his affidavit (R. 11) that his representative at 
the hearings failed to bring out the true facts, including 
failure to go into customs, work rules and interpretations 
( R. 10) which modified the Agreements, nor was plain-
tiff ever advised what rights he had to bring out the 
facts at the hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS A THIRD-PARTY BENE-
FICIARY OF THE AGREEMENTS BE-
TWEEN HIS UNION AND THE DEFEN-
DANT (R. 35) WHICH PROVIDES HIS EM-
PLOYMENT CANNOT BE TERMINATED 
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE. 
Article 46, Sec. 1, at P. 21, Supplemental Agreement 
(R. 35) unequivocally states, "The Employer shall not 
discharge nor suspend an employee without just cause 
. . .". This provision is for the benefit of Union mem-
bers employed by defendant, and plaintiff, as one of its 
employees, and a member of the Union, is a third-party 
beneficiary therof. 
Defendant admits plaintiff was a Union member of 
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Local 222 and covered by the Supplemental Agreement 
(R. at P. 32 and 33), nor does it dispute that its common 
law right to discharge an employee for any or no reason 
was restricted by the agreements (R. 14). 
The allegation in plaintiff's complaint that he was 
discharged without just cause is the heart of the com-
plaint, since he was damaged through loss of his senior-
ity rights and his job and the complaint alleges a cause 
of action which cannot be resolved by summary judg-
ment. 
A favorable verdict in favor of the plaintiff at a trial 
on the merits would under the terms of the agreements 
that plaintiff could not be discharged except for just 
cause empowers the Court to order defendant reinstated 
on his job. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF HAS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN 
HIS SENIORITY RIGHTS ACCUMULATED 
AS RESULT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT UN-
DER THE AGREEMENTS. 
Article 43, Sec. 1 (a), P. 11, of the Supplemental 
Agreement provides: 
Seniority rights for employees shall prevail. 
Seniority rights shall be broken by discharge 
• • • 
The law is well settled that seniority rights under 
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employment contracts are "property rights". Ledford v. 
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., (111.) 18 N. E. 2d 568, 
held that railroad switchmen's seniority rights under em-
ployment contracts with railroad company are enforce-
able property rights. Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading 
Seashore Lines, (N. J. Eq.) 61 A. 2d 453, ruled that the 
seniority right of an employee is a property right and the 
court had jurisdiction to enforce such right. Among 
other cases which reached similar conclusions are: Evans 
v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (Ga.), 12 S. E. 2d 611 at P. 
615. Earle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (Tenn.), 167 S. W. 
2d 15 at P. 24, 25. Fine v. Pratt, Tex. Civ. App., 150 S. W. 
2d 308, 312. Aulich v. Craigmyle, (Ky.), 59 S. W. 2d 560. 
POINT III. 
AN AGREEMENT IS VOID AS AGAINST 
PUBLIC POLICY WHEN APPLIED TO CON-
TROVERSY OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 
WHICH EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICA-
TION EXCLUDES LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 
The thrust of defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment (R. 18) which it tried to bolster by an affidavit 
(R. 19, 20, 21) and a memorandum of authorities (R. 
13, 14, 15, 16) was that the National Master Freight 
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement (R. 35) 
provide the sole machinery to hear and determine griev-
ances between employer and employee and the decision 
rendered was final and absolute, and excluded legal 
proceedings on the same grievance. 
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In Pearson v. Anderburg, et a/., 28 U. 45, 80 P. 307, 
decided in 1905 and still the law, the facts were these: 
The administrator of the estate of a deceased member 
of a Beneficial Association sued to recover an allowance 
for funeral expenses provided for by the laws of the As-
sociation and the Association refused to pay. Among 
the defenses, the Association relied on a stipulation be-
tween the deceased and the Association which read, "I 
will seek by remedy for all legal rights on account of said 
membership or connection herewith in the tribunals of 
the order only, without resorting to their enforcement 
. . . to the civil courts". 
Justice Straup speaking for the court (80 P. at P. 
309) said: 
We have no doubt of the power of members of 
a voluntary association to restrict themselves, 
as to matters incidental to the operation of the 
association, to remedies before tribunals created 
by the association, the nature and kind of which 
we need not here consider. We are, however, 
of the opinion that this case does not fall within 
such rule. The rights to the moneys due here 
was a property right, and one created by and 
growing out of a contract. The fundamental 
principle of law governing this matter is con-
cisely stated by the Maine Court: "The law, 
and not the contract, prescribes the remedy, and 
parties have no more right to enter into stipu-
lations against a resort to the courts for their 
remedy in a given case than they have to pro-
vide a remedy prohibited by law". Stephenson 
v. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55. 
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Since plaintiff had seniority property rights, this 
case should settle any question as to the right of plain-
tiff to have his grievance adjudicated in the civil courts. 
POINT IV. 
EXHAUSTION OF GRIEVANCE PROCED-
URE PURSUANT TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
AGREEMENT DO NOT PREVENT PLAIN-
TIFF FROM HAVING HIS GRIEVANCE 
ADJUDICATED. 
Article 45, Sec. 1, at P. 16 of Supplemental Agree-
ment provides: 
"The Union and the Employers agree that there 
shall be no . . . legal proceedings without first 
using all possible means of settlement as pro-
vided for in this agreement and in the National 
Agreement if applicable, of any controversy 
which might arise. Disputes shall be taken up 
between the Employer and the Local Union in-
volved. Failing adjustment by these parties, the 
following procedure shall then apply . . .". (The 
balance of said Article delineates where and by 
whom the various grievances are to be heard.) 
Article 45 supra, applies to all the grievances be-
tween the Union and Employers, including those involv-
ing grievances of employees, such as in the instant case. 
This Article specifically states, "Legal proceedings" can-
not be commenced without first using all possible means 
of settlement as provided in the Agreement. Plaintiff 
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did use all possible means and then proceeded to do what 
the Agreement did not exclude, commence legal proceed-
ings. Plaintiff submits Article 45 only requires that pro-
cedures provided in the Agreements be exhausted before 
judication is sought by legal proceedings. 
POINT V. 
THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE GRIEV-
ANCE COMMITTEES DENIED PLAIN-
TIFF DUE PROCESS DUE TO INCOMPE-
TENCE OF HIS UNION REPRESENTA-
TIVE. 
Article 45, Sec. 1 (g), P. 18 provides that grievance 
procedures can only be invoked by the authorized Union 
Representative or the employer. Plaintiff had no choice 
as to who could represent him at the hearings and his 
affidavit (R. 10, 11 and 12) delineates how poorly he 
was represented. 
Neither by his Union or the grievance committee, 
plaintiff was not told if he had a right to appear by coun-
sel or any other person of his choice. 
As a rule in a criminal case, if an accused appears 
in court by counsel of his choice, he cannot later claim 
denial of due process, Lunee, et al., Appts. v. Overlade, 
Warden of the Indiana State Prison, 244 F. 2d 108, but, 
when counsel is not of his choice, who incompetently 
represented the accused, in numerous cases and in vari-
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ous jurisdictions new trials have been granted to accused 
on this point alone. 74 A. L. R. 2d 1390 (ANNO.). 
Plaintiff did not receive proper representation at 
his grievance hearings. Defendant claims the grievance 
hearingfis are final and, if this is so, any injustice done 
to the plaintiff could never be corrected. Neither the 
Master Agreement nor the Supplemental Agreement pro-
vide any remedy for a rehearing or an appeal within the 
grievance procedure when the injured party believes he 
was damaged by the way he was represented and how 
the hearings were conducted. Certainly, when a persons's 
property rights and livelihood are involved, it would be 
a tragedy to foreclose such a person from seeking relief 
in the courts. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment below 
should be reversed and the lower court be ordered to 
proceed with the trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Attorney for Appellant 
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